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Introduction
Ireland’s path toward integration in the international and specifically the EU economy has
been punctuated by painful experiences of economic and social crisis. Since the turn toward
trade liberalization in the early 1960s, none was more severe than the extreme fiscal
difficulties, high unemployment, mass emigration, and towering public debt problems of the
1980s. These gave rise to a concerted stabilization of the public finances, supported by the
initiation of institutions and practices of social partnership. Originating in the experience of
economic crisis, these have now lasted some twenty years. But underlying these twists and
turns we detect strong underlying features in the policy of adjustment to new international
pressures, most prominently perhaps a consistent and coherent industrial development policy
(Bradley 2000; 2004; FitzGerald 2000). This paper explores some puzzles arising from what
we perceive as the underlying consistency in Ireland’s manner of adjustment to trade
liberalization.
The Irish economy underwent a profound transformation in the composition of economic
activity between the 1960s and the 1990s. This might have been expected to create significant
dislocations for different sectors in the economy and indeed to have presented some
difficulties for governments promoting these changes. Comparative literature suggests that
trade liberalization is likely to give rise to a set of complementary domestic policies – to
‘compensate’ domestic interests, both producer and worker interests – for these challenges.
But we do not detect the pattern of association between trade liberalization and policy
interventions in Ireland that would be predicted by the core literature on this subject. This is
not to say that transfer social spending or supports to domestic industry were absent; rather,
they were not put in place on a comparable scale to other countries. We suggest that this is
due in part to constraints on government policy arising from the timing of Ireland’s
integration into the international economy, and specifically into the EU with its market-
building emphasis. We also wish to suggest that this is explicable in terms of domestic
politics, the profile of winners and losers, the divisions between and within sectors, and the
way their interests were represented politically. We do not see a purely market-driven process
of policy change: domestic institutions continuously mediate the impact of international
economic integration on national interests.2 Geary WP/6/2008
Economic openness and its political consequences
The decades from the end of the Second World War to the mid-1970s constitute a distinct
phase in European political economy. The dominant policy stance during this period has been
termed ‘embedded liberalism’ (Ruggie 1982), combining international trade openness with
what in many countries was experienced as strong domestic interventionism by governments
committed to the ‘Keynesian welfare state’. As Polanyi had noted of the 19
th-century
highwater era of free-market capitalism, ‘laissez-faire was utopian; …stopped by the realistic
self-protection of society’ (Polanyi 1944/1975, p.141). That is to say, organized labour sought
to restrain the effects of unfettered market activity, and to ensure statutory regulation of
working conditions and some assurance of minimum income entitlements. Where stable
political compromises had not been possible in the early part of the 20
th century, there had
been a slide toward protectionism, authoritarian nationalism, and fascism, which in turn
provided the context for the devastations of the Second World War (Block 2001). In the
postwar decades, the reconstruction of international trade relations and the expansion of the
scope of the market meant a growing exposure of more employees to the hazards that ensue
from integration into the international economy. Hence, according to this argument, we see
international economic liberalism going hand in hand with improved social protection.
Within this general trend much variation can be identified. One strand of analysis holds that
small states displayed a particular pattern of adjustment to growing integration in the
international economy. Cameron, for example, noted a strong inverse correlation between the
size of the economy and the volume of the ‘public economy’: small states tended to have
large public sectors (Cameron 1978). He argued that this was attributable to the tendency of
small countries to develop highly concentrated industrial sectors, which would be conducive
to a centralized or coordinated approach to wage formation, which would in turn strengthen
trade union political influence and the electoral basis of left-wing governments: an analysis
that closely matched the Swedish experience in particular. Authors such as Ruggie and
Rodrik have argued that the ‘compensation hypothesis’ was not confined to small countries,
but extended to all countries in virtue of their exposure to greater economic insecurity arising
from trade liberalization (Rodrik 1998; Ruggie 1982).3 Geary WP/6/2008
Katzenstein demonstrated that that the small European states that featured both a mature
industrial sector and stable democracy ‘complemented their pursuit of liberalism in the
international economy with a strategy of domestic compensation’ (Katzenstein 1985, p.47).
He noted two models: one took the form of building large welfare states in response to labour
strength, as in Sweden; alternatively, he identified a more business-friendly policy
combination, as in Switzerland, under a highly regulated form of economic management.
This distinction between a Social Democratic and a business-led variant of small open
economy adjustment applied only to European countries that were already highly developed
and with a sizeable industrial sector by the 1970s. Poorer countries such as Ireland and
Finland, and recently democratized countries such as Portugal and Greece were thus
explicitly excluded from consideration.
During the 1990s, questions began to be raised as to whether there was any future for such
distinctive patterns of economic adjustment. Growing international capital mobility, the
internationalization of production, increased volumes of trade, imposed new constraints on
governments’ macroeconomic policies, especially for leftist governments who most depended
on maintaining fiscal policy autonomy. Tighter fiscal constraints put limits to what welfare-
oriented governments, whether Social Democratic or Christian Democratic in composition,
might be able to achieve (Iversen and Wren 1998; van Kersbergen 1995). And yet
globalization did not force convergence on a uniform neo-liberal policy prescription.
Governments may indeed have been more constrained, but there was still a choice available.
As Ruggie commented, where fiscal policy is under pressure, ‘The prudent course of
action… is to “review and redesign” the social safety net, not simply to “slash and trash” it’
(Ruggie 1997, p.10).
The nature of the choices continued, as before, to be mediated by the profile of domestic
economic interests and the pattern of their interactions within the domestic political
institutional context. Garrett’s cross-national analyses concluded that in countries where
Social Democratic politics was already well established – with strong leftist governments
with a long tradition of government incumbency, and powerful trade unions capable of
coordinating their collective action – globalization actually increased rather than diminished
the incentives for government to continue to pursue an interventionist policy combination
(Garrett 1998). There is no evidence for the ‘efficiency hypothesis’ (Garrett 1995, p.640) –4 Geary WP/6/2008
that is, the claim that international competitiveness pressures alone will squeeze the role of
state spending on expansionary and interventionist policies.
But most countries fall into some mixed category, where the balance of power did not shift in
any uniform or simple direction. Rather, new coalitions of interests opened up in sometimes
unexpected ways. The growth of the services sector that was more resistant to unionization,
the increase in part-time and temporary work, often associated with the expansion of
women’s employment, the and the continuing strength of unions in the public sector,
fragmented organized labour and made it harder for unions to work to a single agenda in
wage bargaining. The preferences of export-oriented manufacturers increasingly diverged
from those in sheltered sectors, resulting in a fragmentation of employer interests. New
cleavages of interest cut across employer-labour lines within sectors, rather than across
sectors on conventional class lines (Kinderman 2005; Pontusson and Swenson 1996;
Swenson 1991).
But these trends were felt differently depending on the underlying economic structure. In
liberal market economies (LMEs), with an institutional bias toward market-driven solutions
to investment, growth, and pay determination, increased economic internationalization is
likely to further strengthen a market-driven pattern of adjustment (Hall and Gingerich 2004;
Hall and Soskice 2001; Soskice 1999). In coordinated market economies (CME), however,
the existence of interlocking policy commitments may not make market-conforming
outcomes the most preferred solution for actors within the system – or more accurately,
perhaps, it will not necessarily be the solution to which they converge as the most desirable in
the circumstances (Thelen 2000).
But the boundary lines between clusters of countries can be hard to delineate very clearly.
And once again it may be that smaller states have discovered new and unexpectedly flexible
ways of adjusting successfully to emergent economic challenges. For example, if labour
market ridigity was one of the problems resulting from the growth of welfare states,
addressing this has not necessarily resulted in ‘workfare’ on the British or US models, but
may result in a more nuanced combination of labour market and social protection strategies,
as in the case of Denmark’s ‘flexicurity’ policy mix (Dingeldey 2007). Ireland is frequently
cited along with Denmark, the Netherlands, and Finland, among smaller states with flexible5 Geary WP/6/2008
yet welfare-friendly adjustment strategies (Annett 2007; Auer 2000; Schwartz and Becker
2005). And Ireland is one among a number of countries – again, not exclusively, but most
significantly smaller states – that have sought to address issues about wage competitiveness
and fiscal constraints, not by crushing unions or unleashing market forces, but within a
bargaining context. The competitiveness agenda is prominent in these new social pacts, but
so too is a concern with social equity, in what has been termed ‘competitive corporatism’
(Avdagic et al. 2005; Molina and Rhodes 2002; Rhodes 1998).
All these perspectives on how states – and especially small states – adapt to growing trade
exposure provide the framework for us in which to analyse the Irish experience. We need to
consider how a small country that has close affinities with the Anglo-American style of
capitalism, but which is also intensifying its trade links with continental Europe, has
responded to the challenge of increased exposure to international trade and increased
integration into the international economy.
We recognize that a broad differentiation of types of capitalism is persuasive. But the
typologies are only guides to understanding: we must bring back into view both the potential
for active policy innovation, and the variations in scope for domestic coalition-building
behind different policy options.
From the literature, we would expect to find some evidence of the compensation hypothesis
in Ireland. That is, we would anticipate that Ireland’s increasing trade liberalization and
growing integration into the international economy would result in evidence of offsetting
state expenditures and interventions. The compensation hypothesis suggests that governments
will spend not only on cash-based social transfers (unemployment and other benefits), but
also on positive welfare enhancements such as improved social services, and on aids to
domestic industry to help them adapt (Katzenstein 1985; 2003). Indeed, new growth theory
underpins some of this logic, suggesting that government spending on improving productive
assets in areas such as education and human capital, physical infrastructure, and research and
development, by boosting productivity, supports rather than undermines growth potential
(Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1995). Whether and to what degree, then, Ireland’s experience
conforms to the compensation hypothesis is the next step in our discussion.6 Geary WP/6/2008
Ireland’s openness in comparative context
In 1960, Ireland had experienced almost twenty years of protectionist policies and an attempt
at import-substituting industrial development. It had missed out on the first decade of post-
war European trade expansion: some 40% of the workforce was engaged in agriculture; most
industrial production was small-scale and intended for the domestic market; Britain was
virtually the sole trading partner (Kennedy et al. 1988). In 1960, the value of imports and
exports as a proportion of Irish GDP was about 55%. Following the turn toward trade
liberalization export orientation, and policies more favourable to inward investment from
about 1960 on, economic openness began in increase, then took a sudden leap upward after
EEC membership in 1973 (see Fig. 1).
Fig. 1 about here.
By the early 2000s, Ireland was one of the most open economies in the developed world, with
a ratio of imports plus exports to GDP of 98%, and 118% in relation to GNP. The
Netherlands stood at 97%, Austria at 71% and Sweden at 62%, and New Zealand at 44%.
The USA stood at 19%, Britain at 39%; the EU15 average was 54% (OECD Economic
Outlook 2004 – see Fig. 2 below). Indeed, on another measure, Ireland consistently appeared
in the top three globalized states in the world in the Foreign Affairs/ Kearney Index of
Globalization during the 2000s. (See, for example,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/users/login.php?story_id=2493&URL=http://www.foreignpoli
cy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=2493&page=7).
Fig. 2 about here.
Irish public spending in 1960 was relatively low in comparative terms. Government current
expenditure, measuring all non-capital government activity including social transfers and
social spending, grew steadily thereafter, as Fig. 3 shows. The trend shows marked dips at
intervals, especially during the phase of fiscal retrenchment in the late 1980s – but in real
terms, the trend is consistently upward.
Fig. 3 about here.7 Geary WP/6/2008
In comparative perspective, though, Ireland has not been a high spender. Starting from quite a
low base in 1960, and even allowing for the steady upward trend in spending in real terms,
public spending in general and spending on social transfers, social services, and other forms
of welfare provision, stayed at an overall relatively low level. During the 2000s, for example,
we can see that government consumption expenditure – whether measured as a proportion of
GDP or of GNP – is very much at the lower end of the OECD spectrum, as Fig. 4 shows.
Fig. 4 about here.
And relatively to the trend lines in other OECD countries – including smaller European states
– it has been consistently at the lower end of the distribution, as Fig. 5 shows (and although
this only indicates spending in relation to GDP, looking instead at GNP does not alter
Ireland’s relative position significantly).
Fig. 5 about here.
On the face of it, the evidence is mixed: comparative low spending rates, but increasing
rapidly in absolute terms. To what extent, then, can we identify evidence for the
compensation hypothesis in Irish political economy? Our initial analysis seeks to find
underlying patterns in the way states respond to common challenges over time. We seek to
test whether or not there is any deep association between openness and government spending
response.
To do this we constructed a time series of some key variables. We undertook a cointegration
analysis of how these may have covaried over time across countries; this proved inconclusive
because of the complexity of the interactions being modelled. We therefore explored another
way of analysing how countries might cluster, if at all, in the underlying dynamics of their
responses to growing economic openness, based on averaging the associations as ratios for
each decade.
First we constructed a measure of ‘Economic Openness’, defined as the sum of exports and
imports expressed as a proportion of GDP (or GNP for Ireland – though we found that using
one or the other measure did not affect the overall findings significantly). We constructed this
measure for 17 countries for every year from 1970 to 2005.8 Geary WP/6/2008
We would anticipate that one of the characteristic responses in a small open economy would
be an increase in state supports to domestic industry to enable them to adapt to the more
hazardous market environment. This is measured in terms of Gross Fixed Capital Formation,
plus industrial subsidies.
We would also anticipate that growing openness would result in an increase in social
spending, again in line with Katzenstein’s observation that those most exposed to increases in
market hazards would seek stronger protection. We took the standardized OECD definition of
social benefits as the appropriate measure. We then constructed a measure of ‘Government
Intervention’ that synthesized these two strands. As with all our variables, this was computed
for every country for every year.
We then constructed a measure of social vulnerability, to assess the extent of the demands
being made on governments. This is defined as a combination of age- and youth-dependency
(over 65 and under 15), plus those who were unemployed. This is a measure of ‘Social
Need’. The next step in this phase of the analysis was to compute a ratio of ‘Government
Intervention’ to ‘Social Need’, to give a measure of spending by government relative to those
in need in the society. This we define as a measure of ‘State Effort’.
Finally, we constructed a measure of ‘State Effort’ in relation to ‘Economic Openness’. This
gives us a final time series of ‘State Response to Openness’. This measures the extent to
which public compensation (capturing industrial supports as well as cash transfers), per
dependent individual in the population as defined above, increases with each additional
incremental degree of economic openness. We then averaged the evidence of this series, and
analysed how this compared country by country. Three clusters emerge clearly, as Table 1
shows.
Table 1 about here.
What we take this to mean is that in the countries with a high score on ‘State Effort’, public
spending on the range of ‘compensatory’ issues is considerably greater than would have been
expected from the overall profile of countries’ responses to economic openness. For each
incremental experience of economic openness, Sweden, Denmark and Norway have
responded with much greater ‘Government Intervention’ in relation to ‘Social Need’ than the9 Geary WP/6/2008
generality of countries. In the medium-scoring countries, patterns vary considerably, but
within a broadly comparable range.
In the lowest-scoring group of countries, the association between our variables shows that
‘Government Response to Openness’ is particularly weak. In this analysis, Ireland clusters
with the less-developed countries of Southern Europe in its pattern of political responses to
economic openness. We find that Britain is most appropriately situated in this category too –
relative to its openness, its level of state spending on industrial supports and social
compensation has been less than would have been expected from the general trend across all
societies. Belgium is something of an anomaly here: on the standard measures, its economy is
exceptionally open, mainly in view of its role as an international administrative capital for the
EU, with considerable levels of inflow and outflow of capital. In this sense, public spending
is low relative to openness; we believe a different estimator of Belgian fiscal effort (including
debt levels) and industrial composition would give a different and perhaps more realistic
picture.
These findings suggest that averaged over a whole 35-year period, countries do tend to
display some underlying strategic response to openness; and that they tend to group in broad
terms. But Table 1 which reports these relationships as average trends over very different
economic phases may be masking time-sensitive changes. Might it be the case that Ireland’s
relative ranking changes over time? For example, it may be that in the early phase of slower
trade liberalization during the 1960s, when Ireland was also relatively poor in comparative
terms, welfare effort was still at quite low levels, but that this may have changed with greater
trade openness. It may be that as Ireland became much wealthier during the 1990s, the level
of ‘State Effort’ in relation to openness was much greater.
To explore these possibilities, we repeated the exercise described above for each ten-year
average period starting in 1970, ie 1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2006. While
this periodization does not perfectly capture fluctuations in international economic business
cycles, it does make it possible to differentiate our countries’ experiences to some degree.
[Tables 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2d, 2e, 2f, about here? Or in an Appendix?]10 Geary WP/6/2008
In fact, as Tables 2a-f reveal, an analysis of openness by decade does not disrupt the
groupings and makes only marginal changes to the rank-ordering of countries.
In order to understand what the sources of variation are across countries, we are compelled to
look within countries at the variations in domestic institutional profiles and the strategic
interactions of the main economic actors (Scharpf 1997). We also need to be sensitive to the
dominant ideas and values that shaped their sense of what was politically possible – ideas can
have an independent explanatory value, and ‘discourse’ can make a difference to how actors
engage with one another (Blyth 2002; Hall 1997; Schmidt 2003). Why, then, does Ireland
show so little evidence of the compensation hypothesis in action?
The social compensation model in Ireland
We might draw out two competing implications from the evidence outlined above. The first
might be that the compensation hypothesis simply is not relevant to the Irish case: Irish
governments did not behave in a manner consistent with the expectations that they would
provide appropriate supports to ease and assist the process of adjustment to trade
liberalization. This hypothesis does not seem compelling for two reasons. Firstly, we have
already noted that government expenditure did indeed rise steadily. We do not see a
minimalist government unleashing relatively untamed market forces. And secondly, in an
established democracy, governments cannot be oblivious to the consequences of social
dislocation where they occur, nor heedless of the possible electoral backlash that might arise
from popular discontent.
An alternative hypothesis would suggest therefore that the aggregate trends we have noted
are somehow not capturing more nuanced ways in which governments were in fact
responding. This would suggest that we need to identify which were the most vulnerable
sectors or interests, and look more closely at the nature and extent of compensation
mechanisms directed toward them. But this line of analysis also required us to consider why
Irish compensation mechanisms seem to have been more restricted, relative to the extent of
openness, than has been apparent in other open economies.11 Geary WP/6/2008
Trade liberalization and ‘Government Effort’
We can identify two phases of trade liberalization in Ireland: the late 1950s to mid-1960s,
which in practice had rather limited consequences; and the decision in 1972 to join the EEC
along with Britain, which had significant consequences for Ireland’s political economy. And
while neither of these moments provoked any crisis, they opened a new development
trajectory which in turn threw up a whole new set of adjustment pressures. If we are to
identify periods of crisis, they may be seen to follow from failed or incomplete attempts to
deal effectively with these, especially apparent in the problems of tax reform, and the poor
management of fiscal policy. And insofar as a new workable policy framework was set up
from 1987 on, we must also be attentive to the limitations and weaknesses of the deals
arrived at.
Ireland had retained its protective tariff barriers well after the rest of Europe had moved
toward trade liberalization. Although they had served the country well since the 1930s in
building up small-scale domestic industry, mostly to meet domestic demand, expert opinion
warned that protection had outlived its usefulness after World War Two (Ó Gráda 1997). A
phase of political instability made decisive reform difficult. But the seeds had been sown by
thinking within the Department of Finance in particular for a reframing of policy options and
a willingness to engage in tariff reduction (Girvin 1989).
Frank Barry has argued that the turn away from protectionism and toward trade liberalization
can be understood quite readily in the context of comparative political economy literature that
asks about how various groups’ interests led them to defend different policy preferences
(Barry and Weir 2007). The sequencing of policy change in the early 1960s had made foreign
ownership relatively uncontentious, as this had already been adopted behind protective tariff
walls. Preferential trade agreements between Britain and Ireland had already been negotiated
under the Anglo-Irish Trade Agreements 1938 and 1948. These were strengthened by the
modest tariff reduction agreement of 1960 and the subsequent Anglo-Irish Free Trade
Agreement (AIFTA) of 1965. Foreign-owned companies from the mid-1950s onward, still a
small sector, were strongly export oriented and supported further trade liberalization. But
from the 1960s on, much of domestic manufacturing industry was recognized as being
vulnerable if exposed to increased competition with British industrial goods. The same12 Geary WP/6/2008
considerations applied when EEC membership was under consideration in the early 1970s.
Industry would gain improved access to European markets, but the fact that indigenous firms
were still largely oriented toward domestic and British markets made this less enticing a
prospect.
Agricultural interests, still very important at this stage, changed their views over time.
Farmers’ support for the AIFTA was bolstered by the fact that the programmes for economic
expansion, developed within the Department of Finance and adopted by the incoming Fianna
Fáil government from 1957 onward, were predicated on an increase in agricultural production
as the way to grow the Irish economy out of the deep recessions of the 1950s. The framing of
the issue of EEC membership in 1972 was somewhat different. Agricultural interests could
not afford to lose preferential access to British markets relative to Commonwealth countries.
If Britain joined the EEC, Ireland must; and the prospect of agricultural subsidies to Ireland
from the EEC was certainly attractive.
Government and opposition alike supported Ireland’s EEC membership despite the fact that a
coalition of domestic industry and the trade union movement opposed it. The logic of export-
led growth prevailed over defence of the labour-intensive traditional manufacturing sector
(O'Malley 1989). The dominant policy was now to grow domestic employment through
increased flows of foreign direct investment (FDI). This would be made easier by having
access to the wider European market. Low corporation taxes for exporting companies were
already in place; the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) was the conduit of additional
supports and subsidies to inward investors, especially into greenfield sites.
This analysis of the politics of trade liberalization highlights the challenges Ireland faced,
first to cope with the relatively modest intensification of competitive pressures during the
1960s, then to the increased industrial competition arising from EEC membership in the
1970s. The ‘completion’ of the internal market in the EU from 1992 on represented the
culmination of the adjustment strategies begun in the 1970s.
In fact we can identify distinctive policy responses, consistent with the compensation
hypothesis, from the early 1960s on. Barry suggests that increases in public spending,
especially public social spending, during the 1960s can be understood as the price undertaken
by the Lemass government to secure the support of the trade union movement to the new13 Geary WP/6/2008
strategy of market-oriented industrial development (Barry and Weir 2007). We might also see
the government’s active commitment to helping domestic industry to cope with new
competitive pressures during the 1960s in a similar light. The employer-labour Committee on
Industrial Organization, for example, aimed to bring business and union representatives
together with academics to improved overall understanding of their respective positions and
of the emergent economic challenges (Hardiman 1988). Other bodies such as An Foras
Forbartha, An Córas Tráchtála, and AnCO, existed to help domestic manufacturers with
marketing, exporting, and labour force needs. Periodic reviews and indeed in the early 1990s
extensive reorganization of the functions of the Industrial Development Authority were
undertaken to bring the needs of domestic industry into perspective and to assist their
development (O'Sullivan 2000). From the 1970s on, domestic producers were actively
encouraged to seek opportunities to provide upstream as well as downstream linkages with
the new foreign, high-tech, export-oriented industries. There were phases when all this capital
intensification and human capital development seemed to produce only ‘jobless growth’. But
by the boom period of the 1990s, this was generating much greater levels of successful start-
ups and autonomous development of Irish-owned manufacturing and services, and
correspondingly rapid employment generation opportunities (Barry et al. 1999; O'Malley
2004)
A flurry of social legislation in the early to mid 1970s has sometimes been understood as a
form of catch-up in areas of income maintenance (Breen et al. 1990; Curry 2003; McCashin
2004). To some degree this can indeed be understood as a form of modernization, flowing
from increased awareness of British and continental European social provision; but it might
also perhaps be understood in the context of the real growth in economic insecurity attendant
upon trade liberalization. It should be noted that the biggest single category of increased
social spending during the 1970s was in the area of unemployment compensation, but the
single biggest driver of this was not an expansion in entitlement or improved generosity of
provision, but a surge in demand (Maguire 1984). Unemployment levels increased in
response to the twin problems of the 1970s – the international oil-price crisis, and the job
losses in the relatively uncompetitive domestic industry sector in the context of greater
market exposure.14 Geary WP/6/2008
The extreme fiscal problems of the 1980s, which is the period normally identified as the crisis
era of modern Irish political economy, owe their origins to the patterns laid down during the
1970s. There was a persistent tendency to use fiscal policy in a pro- rather than counter-
cyclical manner; in a very open economy there was going to be very little scope for
Keynesian multiplier effects in any case. Deficit fiscal spending had been unknown in Ireland
until the late 1970s, due in large part to the innate caution of the Department of Finance.
Public spending responded strongly to the electoral cycle (Honohan 1992; 1999). Thus we
see pro-cyclical trends in the political management of the economy from the early 1960s on,
although this really only became apparent from the late 1970s when fiscal deficits were first
used. Governments during the 1980s were obliged to attempt to correct these problems in the
throes of international recession, so the effects of the downturn were further deepened by the
fiscal imperative to respond, once again, pro-cyclically.
However, another element in the politics of domestic adjustment to new economic challenges
was to engage organized economic interests with the policy process. Stabilization of fiscal
policy was greatly facilitated by the national consensus created in the mid-1980s to cut debt
levels and reduce fiscal deficits. Evidence of a bias toward tripartism is seen during the
1960s, but only became established and even institutionalized from 1987 on (O'Donnell and
O'Reardon 2002).
Adaptation of employer-relations in Ireland falls into a difficult middle-zone. Where unions
are well-organized, the logic of collective action suggests that they may well face incentives
to adopt an ‘overarching’ strategy in their approach to pay bargaining with employers (Olson
1971). They may be willing to negotiate national or industry-level pay agreements in a
broader context of economic stabilization, possibly eased by the provision of offsetting or
compensating policy commitments by government – the Swedish model for much of the
postwar period (Pontusson 1992). Where unions are weakly organized, or highly
decentralized, especially in liberal market economies, there may be scope for employers,
supported by government, to engage in market-driven marginalization of unions from wage-
setting influence – the British strategy during the 1980s (Garrett 1993). Either of these
options might produce good performance on indicators such as inflation, unemployment,
industrial conflict. A particularly difficult challenge to economic management arises in
situations where unions are well organized but not highly coordinated or centralized, and15 Geary WP/6/2008
employer interests are diverse and not well coordinated. In this context, discrete bargaining
groups can seek to press their advantage to the full. But the cumulative effect of doing this
may well be to increase the incidence of industrial conflict, pushing up wage inflation, and –
especially in the context of small open economies that are obliged to be price takers on the
international market, and where exchange rate policy is not readily negotiable – resulting in
loss of competitiveness and consequently unemployment (Calmfors and Driffill 1988). All
the more so when exchange rate policy is either unavailable or of limited use, as was the case
in Ireland due to the link with sterling until 1979, membership of the EMS during the 1980s,
and acceptance of the disciplines attendant on preparation for and then participation in the
Euro after 1992 (Crouch 2000).
In a pluralist and diverse industrial relations system such as Ireland had inherited from
Britain, the scope for autonomous employer-labour consensus-seeking was always relatively
weak. Initiatives to manage industrial conflict and to shape the terms of pay negotiations have
typically come from government intervention. As early as 1941, Fianna Fáil sought to
introduce new legislation to rationalize trade union organization, recognition, and bargaining
rights. This failed, leaving organizational diversity and a division between British-based and
Irish-based unions (MacCarthy 1977). But it paved the way for the establishment in1946 of
the Labour Court, which sought to exercise significant influence over pay determination over
the following two decades. And even when it foundered in the face of wage competition,
fragmented bargaining, and mounting industrial conflict in the late 1960s, the principle of
government initiative in shaping employer-union negotiations was already in the policy
repertoire.
Ireland’s two phases of recourse to negotiating centralized national-level framework pay
deals on a tripartite basis should therefore be seen as part of the politics of domestic
compensation. The first, from 1970 to 1981, came to an end due to employer resistance to
wage drift, and a recurrence of widespread industrial conflict in the context of uncertain fiscal
prospects. From 1981 to 1987, years of fiscal crisis, extraordinarily high unemployment, and
the return of large-scale emigration, there seemed to scope for and no prospects for anything
other than decentralized pay bargaining. The return to national-level negotiation of social
pact-like deals, through social partnership mechanisms, is generally seen as a turning point in
that phase of economic crisis. The first social partnership deal in 1987, trading wage restraint16 Geary WP/6/2008
for tax cuts, to stabilize public debt and reduce inflation, was understood on all sides as a
crisis-management mechanism (Hastings et al. 2007). The positive feedback effects helped
consolidate confidence and facilitated the institutionalization of a wider range of support
mechanisms for a broadening set of interlinked policy discussions, producing deals of
approximately three years’ duration (Hardiman 2002; 2006).
The Irish industrial relations system diverged significantly from the British during the 1980s
despite its family affinities. Since Ireland also falls into the category of liberal market
economy, this might be surprising. But in the context of our discussion of the relationship
between trade liberalization and domestic compensation, the recurrent interest in some form
of bargained pay deal becomes more understandable. Small open economy incentives came
into play: government sought to mediate market-based conflicts and to support a coordinated
industrial relations response to new economic hazards.
Explaining the limits to the compensation hypothesis
We have seen that it is possible to identify a more targeted but still real state role in putting in
the supports for economic adjustment to trade liberalization. But these appear to have
produced a significantly lower level of state effort than would have been anticipated, both
from theoretical expectations and from comparative experiences. Why, then, was ‘state
effort’ at a relatively low level in Ireland? A number of explanations can be proposed. Firstly,
the core logic of the proposition about trade liberalization could itself be opened to question.
The alignment of interests arising from the changing economic structure needs to be analysed
more closely. And secondly, the politics of accommodation at the heart of social partnership
need to be explored more fully.
The proposition that increased trade liberalization is linked with more compensation
mechanisms assumes that greater openness makes economic performance more volatile, such
that governments either respond to electoral pressure for relevant protection, or act in
anticipation of such pressure. But it may be the case, that a deepening of international
economic integration actually stabilizes economic fluctuations affecting those in the exposed
sector of the economy (Down 2007). In the Irish case, while domestic manufacturing suffered
severely – all but wiping out most traditional industry –what was accomplished through
greater economic openness over the course of forty years was nothing short of a profound17 Geary WP/6/2008
restructuring of the economy. Trade openness made it possible to generate whole new
industrial sectors, through a combination of FDI and spinoff domestic enterprise (Barry and
Bradley 1997). The result was a wholesale upgrading of the employment structure and an
ongoing impetus toward increasingly knowledge-intensive and high-tech investments, the
virtual elimination of unemployment, and a rapid increase in women’s employment, as well
as a convergence in average incomes toward north-west European averages by the early
2000s (O'Connell 2000; O'Connell and Russell 2007; Ó Riain 2004). The result was that by
the 2000s about half of all employment in manufacturing and the great majority of exports
were accounted for by foreign-owned firms, mostly American. A growing share of both
employment and exports came from internationally traded services, both Irish and foreign-
owned. Openness was experienced as opportunity as well as threat.
These changes in the composition of the economy have a bearing on the representation of
interests and their articulation into both social partnership and party political representation.
The cleavage structure in Irish politics cut across class lines for the most part, and the Labour
Party, while entirely comparable with other European Social Democratic parties, attracted the
smallest support base among European countries (Mair 1992). The strong and pervasive
influence of the Catholic Church had also made it difficult, in a relatively poor and largely
agricultural society, for progressive or redistributive politics to make much inroad.
Governments had an incentive to build cross-class coalitions of support; but the centre of
gravity in policy profiles was toward the centre-right, reflecting the distribution of voter
preferences (Benoit and Laver 2005; Laver 1992). There was relatively little scope for the
politics of welfare state expansion along conventional Social Democratic or Christian
Democratic lines. Welfare spending – on both transfers and services – increased rapidly
during the 1990s and 2000s; but income inequality grew, transfers did not track wages, and
services continued to trail in quality relative to countries of comparable wealth (Layte et al.
2004; Nolan and Maitre 2007; Whelan et al. 2007).
Social partnership agreements must be understood in this context too. The composition and
profile of the trade union movement helps to account for the terms on which it participated in
partnership structures. During the 1970s, the more extreme fragmentation of the trade union
movement from earlier times had started to be overcome through a combination of a drive
from the trade union leadership and changes in industrial relations legislation. But18 Geary WP/6/2008
coordination of pay policy across the trade union movement proved difficult, because what
was emerging was a two-tier employment structure. Wage leadership, in effect, was now
exercised by the newly expanding high-tech, export-oriented, and mostly foreign-owned
sector. But this was very much more profitable than the more sheltered domestic sector, and
leapfrogging pay demands were further driven by the highly interlocking structure of public
sector employments. This limited the effectiveness of pay coordination during the first phase
of national wage agreements (Hardiman 1988).
By the late 1980s and the 1990s, the profile of employment had changed considerably. While
trade union numbers had held up well, trade union density had slipped to about 40%, as
unionization had not kept pace with rapidly growing employment opportunities: estimates of
private sector unionization were sometimes as low as 10%, while up to 80% of the public
sector was unionized and about half of all union members were public sector employees
(Hardiman 2006). The new wave of service industry, both high-end and less skilled, tended to
be weakly unionized, especially in the context of a highly buoyant labour supply. Most of the
new crop of high-tech companies were now non-union employers (Gunnigle et al. 2005).
Union recognition was a thorn in the side of the trade union leadership and a recurrent issue
of principle for them, though not necessarily a felt grievance among most of the workforce
concerned. The exporting sector was no longer a generator of above-the-norm pay claims –
partly because it was itself subject to intensified global competitiveness pressures and was
largely content to conform to local pay norms; but partly too because it could avail of
company-level pay flexibility through discretionary means such as bonuses and other
schemes (Roche and Geary 2000). Pay agreements were therefore principally negotiated by
the public sector, construction, banking, and Irish-owned manufacturing. By and large the
pay deals held. But the diversity of the labour force, the emergence of a multi-speed
economy, and composition of trade union membership frequently put the construction of a
coherent pay policy under severe pressure, as Table 3 illustrates.
The main focus of union as well as employer involvement in social partnership agreements
was therefore on disposable income. Martin Rhodes has termed such deals ‘competitive
corporatism’, since while social pacts were still about protecting workers from the full rigours
of market disciplines, unions had accepted the logic of business imperatives, often in high-
unemployment contexts (Rhodes 1998; 2001). Ireland’s pay pacts did not very strongly19 Geary WP/6/2008
resemble the social pacts in other small European economies such as the Netherlands or
Denmark in the 1990s, where employer-union deals were negotiated bilaterally, but where
strong union and employer involvement in reforming welfare services went together with
commitment to competitiveness-enhancing measures (Traxler 2004). The development of
Irish social services remained largely outside the influence of unions and employers alike, in
spite of the existence of myriad social partnership working groups, the National Anti-Poverty
Strategy, and similar initiatives (Hardiman 2006). Unions could lobby to keep issues on the
political agenda. But governments could pick and choose which issues to prioritize; the social
partners had no institutional access to either the planning or the delivery of income
maintenance or other social services schemes.
The 1970s pay deals had been focused on securing pay deals above the level of inflation. The
social partnership deals of the 1980s and 1990s were based on tax cuts in exchange for wage
moderation. The emphasis may have shifted from headline pay increases to disposable
income, but individuals’ assessments of the impact on their own incomes were decisive.
So politically mediated offsets for wage restraint did not take the form of collective
consumption, or the social wage, that is, building up the welfare state, unlike the way in
which the logic of domestic compensation played out in, for example, the Nordic countries.
Rather, it took the form of tax cuts, improvements in household disposable income, and
individual financial well-being. The trade union leadership adopted these priorities because
they were constrained by the distribution of preferences among their membership. The pay
deals were legitimated and bedded down by putting the deals to a ballot of members (Baccaro
and Simoni 2002). Like voters more generally, welfare spending and welfare services are
valued, but do not feature strongly as electoral issues or personal motivators in electoral
choice. We have relatively little Irish evidence of whether or in what ways preferences for
welfare spending might vary by employment sector, of the sort that exists for other countries
(Balcells Ventura 2004). But there seems to be little basis either in Irish public attitudes or in
Irish political discourse for the politics of redistribution or collective consumption (Hardiman
et al. 2006; Hardiman and Whelan 1994).20 Geary WP/6/2008
Conclusion
This paper found that the aggregate comparative evidence points toward Ireland being out of
line with the expectations of the compensation hypothesis. Although it is a small open
economy that underwent a rapid extension of trade liberalization, accompanied by rapid
transformation of the employment structure, compensation spending did not keep in line with
what would have been predicted.
We have suggested that this can be explained in two ways. Firstly, compensation strategies
were indeed put in place, but their fiscal visibility is lower than elsewhere. And we need to
take account not only of spending measures, but also of the strategic reorientation of
industrial relations out of the experience of profound crisis and national economic
vulnerability. Consensus orientation and conflict management strategies feature strongly in
Irish political culture, and have to be understood not only or even primarily as a product of
nationalist ideology, but as rooted in the incentives flowing from the country’s political
economy.
Secondly, the reasons why ‘state effort’ was lower than comparative trends might
have indicated need to be explored further. We have suggested that Ireland entered its phase
of economic modernization and industrial development with a policy inheritance of targeted
and means-tested social welfare and a conservative orientation toward the redistributive
capacity of the state. Governments did indeed undertake policies consistent with the
compensation hypothesis. But we have suggested that the scope of their further choices was
constrained by two further considerations: by the very conditions of the industrialization
strategy that had been adopted by all parties, and by the nature of partisan mobilization
around issues of left and right. Ireland was a liberal market economy with a heavy reliance on
FDI and a policy mix based on maintaining low corporation tax. It cannot be said that a pro-
business and pro-competitiveness policy mix was consistently adopted; the loading of the tax
burden onto employees during periods of acute fiscal difficulties was an easy political option,
though one resented and resisted by employers. Nevertheless, the policy preferences of
business interests, including influential American investors, constrained the possibilities
governments were willing to consider about the behaviour of the labour market and the rights
of trade unions. Finally, neither the party system nor the industrial relations system was well21 Geary WP/6/2008
adapted to making issues of welfare state expansion a central priority. The Irish model, with
its combination of pro-business supports in a liberal market economy, with a social
partnership system that, while delivering primarily on individualist interests, also kept
collective employee interests in view, represented a distinctive strategy of adjustment to trade
liberalization and integration into the European and global economy.22 Geary WP/6/2008





















Variables used in calculating these indicators:
1. Economic Openness =
(Imports plus Exports) / GDP, or GNP
2. Government Intervention=
Gross Fixed Capital Formation, plus industrial subsidies, plus Government Social
Expenditure
3. Social Need=
Age Dependency (65+), plus Youth Dependency (0-14), plus Unemployed
4. State Effort=
(Government Intervention) / Social Need
5. State Response to Openness =
State Effort / Economic Openness
Date drawn from: OECD Economic Indicators23 Geary WP/6/2008
Tables 2 a-f. Comparative Performance: rate of change, and profile by decade
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2000 6·6 12·4 5·7 8·3 6·2
2001 8·0 8·7 9·9 8·0 10·9
2002 6·5 9·9 4·8 3·4 4·4
2003 6·8 4·2 4·3 4·6 1·6
2004 4·7 4·8 8·5 5·1 5·6
2005 3·6 7·2 5·9 4·1 4·3
Source: Central Bank Quarterly Bulletin, No. 4, 2006 (October), Table E5, p.92.28 Geary WP/6/2008
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Fig. 2. Index of Economic Openness.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, 2004.
Index of Openness, OECD, 2004
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Fig. 4. Government Consumption Expenditure as % of GDP, 2003.
Government Consumption as % GDP
(& GNP, Ireland), 2003


































Source: Calculated from EU AMECO database.
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/annual_macro_economic_database/a
meco_contents.htm
Item 2 (Consumption), variable UCTG, ‘Total final consumption expenditure of
central government’; and item 7 (Domestic Product and Income), variable ‘GDP’. Both series
in ECU/Euro.32 Geary WP/6/2008
GNP for Ireland 2003: Department of Finance estimate, Economic and Budgetary
Statistics 2004, Table 12.33 Geary WP/6/2008






















Government consumption as % GDP for selected countries
Source: Calculated from EU AMECO database.
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/annual_macro_economic_database/a
meco_contents.htm
Item 2 (Consumption), variable UCTG, ‘Total final consumption expenditure of
central government’; and item 7 (Domestic Product and Income), variable ‘GDP’. Both series
in ECU/Euro.
GNP for Ireland 2003: Department of Finance estimate, Economic and Budgetary
Statistics 2004, Table 12.34 Geary WP/6/2008
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